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What Doesn't Kill Us Makes Us Stronger: But
Can the Same Be Said of the Eurozone?
CAROLITE JENSEN*
This comment provides a brief, analytical survey of the European sovereign debt crisis.
It aims to be user-friendly and accessible to any reader who wants to learn more about the
causes and consequences of Europe's ongoing troubles. Rather than focus on a particular
country, the comment reviews the fiscal Eurozone and its banking system as a whole. It
begins by explaining the key, long-term roots of the Eurozone's present problems. Then,
it provides a critical commentary on attempted reforms, and an analysis of the events that
have unfolded this past year. It concludes by evaluating the Eurozone's options for fiscal
and structural reform going forward.
I. Introduction
The Eurozone sovereign debt crisis is a moving target. Among other things, its roots
are traceable to the 2008 financial crisis, flawed political constructs, risky and dishonest
business practices, and faulty economic models. To the lay observer trying to make sense
of the crisis, the avalanche of news on politicians, banks, and private market players can
overwhelm and obscure. But it is important to wrestle with and understand these issues.
The collective Eurozone is one of the world's largest economies. The debt crisis is rapidly
evolving, and whatever happens in the next few years, for good or for ill, will affect
everyone.
This paper tackles the issue from a particular angle. It discusses the more significant
legal changes occurring within the banking sector in response to the crisis, as well as
external legal changes that will impact the banking sector. The ultimate goal of this analy-
sis is to synthesize the underlying causes and consequences of the sovereign debt crisis,
and present them in a user-friendly manner. The sovereign debt crisis cannot be under-
stood without bringing in elements of politics, economics, and private debt. But for expe-
diency, this comment focuses on developments at the national level (public debts) and
within the European banking sector, particularly the European Central Bank (ECB).
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To frame the discussion, the comment begins with (1) background information on the
crisis; (2) a discussion of internal reforms to the banking sector, and a corresponding dis-
cussion of the external legal reforms presently developing in the Eurozone; and (3) pro-
posals on where the Eurozone may be headed, and where it should be headed. The
banking sector is complicated-this comment aims to be simple.
II. Background: How Did We Get Here?
To analyze the effectiveness of the new European banking regulations and other politi-
cal reforms, one must first understand the underlying problems they are meant to address.
The roots and nature of the sovereign debt crisis are labyrinthine, and so the following
background information is by no means exhaustive. Instead, it highlights some of the key
factors whose interplay led to the crisis. These factors give context to current reforms and
regulations.
A. CRACKS IN THE FOUNDATION
The very adoption of the euro as common currency created two significant problems.
First, it fueled sovereign debt by making cheap credit readily available because the
Eurozone as a whole enjoyed low interest rates. Nations that would have been weaker
individually were buoyed by their association with stronger Eurozone members. Second,
it meant that the disparate economic competitiveness of European nations would no
longer be automatically adjusted by exchange rate devaluations.' The second problem is
not overly publicized outside the business or market sectors, but it should be. It is sys-
temic, and has become increasingly acute in the past decade.2 For example, between 1998
and 2008, German competitiveness rose by 18 percent, while Ireland, Spain, Portugal,
Italy, the Netherlands, and Greece all experienced sharp declines, some by as much as
fifteen to twenty percent.3 The result is a competitiveness imbalance of around 30 to 40
percent. 4 This spread is accompanied by perversely diverging wages of peers across the
Eurozone that persist despite the common currency. 5 For example, at the high end of the
scale (roughly a 40 percent spread), a job that pays C40,000 a year in Germany would cost
roughly C56,000 for its counterpart in Greece. 6 But the Greek economy has less capacity
and productivity than the German economy, and so there is no logical justification for this
disparity. This disparity reveals how Greece used its access to the euro (and Eurozone
credit rates) to subsidize a high-spending lifestyle beyond its individual capacity.
1. David Rhodes & Daniel Stelter, Collateral Damage: What Next? Where Next? What to Expect and How to
Prepare, Bos. CONSULTING GROUP, Jan. 2012, at 7, available at http://images.johnmauldin.com/uploads/pdf/
TheYearsAhead_01 12.pdf.
2. See Economics & FI/FX Research: Friday Notes, UNICREDrr (UniCredit Research, Munich, Germany),
March 26, 2010, at 6 [hereinafter UNICREDI].
3. See id. at 2.
4. Id.
5. It should be noted that price competitiveness, although a key indicator of overall competitiveness, is not
the only one. A country's specializations or innovations, for example, also impact competitiveness.
6. See UNICREDIT, supra note 2, at 6 (comparing the cumulative growth of compensation per employee in
the Eurozone between 2000-2008).
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On top of these problems, a distinct lack of oversight plagued the creation of the fiscal
Eurozone. Originally, a country that wished to enter the Eurozone was required by treaty
to assure its financial stability by meeting the so-called Maastricht Criteria. 7 Generally,
this entailed keeping inflation below 1.5% a year and maintaining a budget deficit of less
than 3 percent of GDP, as well as a debt to GDP ratio of less than 60 percent.8 The entry
treaties empower the European Commission and Council to monitor member states, and
impose sanctions for unrepentant violators. In practice, however, enforcement of the debt
criteria was weak, and government and market actors alike ignored and abandoned them.9
Periphery states like Spain, Italy, and Greece entered the Eurozone by either deferring the
politically unpalatable reforms or by cooking the books. 1° Thus, while these less-solvent
states enjoyed some of the immediate benefits of entry (i.e., an influx of capital and credit),
they remained at a significantly lower productive capacity than other Eurozone states.1'
The image of a teenager with a brand new credit card springs to mind. Italy is an example
of a country for which low productive capacity is a bigger problem than price diver-
gence.' 2 Today, the Maastricht Criteria is largely a moot point because most Eurozone
countries are running huge deficits and unprecedented debts. The Criteria loses both
credibility and relevance as countries become either unwilling or unable to comply.
In sum, then, despite a common currency, underlying structural problems of price com-
petitiveness and productive capacity persist within the Eurozone and have intensified
under market strain. Also, note the interplay of these problems: a country with less pro-
ductive capacity but equal access to credit will have a much more difficult time deleverag-
ing in an economic slump. That is, countries with initially lower productive capacities
that assume disproportionately massive debts cannot easily or naturally outgrow the bur-
den by boosting GDP.
B. UNSUSTAINABLE DEBT
Unprecedented and unsustainable debts are another root cause of the crisis. The Bos-
ton Consulting Group summarizes the scope of the problem of global debt levels as
follows:
Total debt-to-GDP levels in the eighteen core countries of the Organization for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) rose from 160 percent in 1980 to
321 percent in 2010. Disaggregated and adjusted for inflation, these numbers mean
that the debt of nonfinancial corporations increased by 300 percent, the debt of gov-
ernments increased by 425 percent, and the debt of private households increased by
600 percent. 13
7. Treaty on the European Union art. G, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 OJ. (C 191) 1, 5 (specifically, those sections
discussing the amendment of articles 104c and 109j of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community).
8. Id.
9. See LAYNA MOSLEY, GLOBAL CAPITAL & NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS 67 (2003).
10. Christopher Alessi, The Eurozone in Crisis, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., (Dec. 2, 2011), http://
www.cfr.org/eu/eurozone-crisis/p22055.
11. Id.
12. UNICREDIT, supra note 2, at 2.
13. Rhodes & Stelter, Collateral Damage, supra note 1, at 2. The phenomenon is, of course, not confined to
Europe. Recent figures show the major global economies have a combined government debt of $7.6 trillion
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From 2000 to 2010, average government gross debt as a percentage of GDP within the
Eurozone has risen from 69.2% to 85.3%-well beyond the Maastricht Criteria's 60%
limit. 14 Public debt levels have been on an upward trend since the 1970s and have surged
in response to the financial crisis of 2008, as governments faced declining revenues, in-
creasing liabilities, and funding various bailout packages.15 Most Eurozone countries are
struggling simply to stabilize their debt, let alone reduce it.16
When it comes to European sovereign debt, however, the problem is actually much
worse than the debt-to-GDP levels indicate. The true litmus test of sovereign debt is not
simply the official government debt figures-it is also a government's unfunded liabilities
(that is, the difference between expected tax revenues and the projected costs of continu-
ing present government programs). 17 When one considers both government debt and
unfunded liabilities as a percentage of GDP, the resulting fiscal imbalances in Europe are
staggering. The average EU country would need more than four times its GDP sitting in
the bank and earning interest simply to continue funding its programs.18 Consider one of
the worst offenders-Greece. Eurostat reports that Greece's 2010 government debt to
GDP ratio was 142.8%. 19 This is above the average in Europe, but it pales in comparison
to Greece's projected unfunded liabilities, which would cost around 875% of its total
GDP to continue. 20 Fiscal imbalances this high point to one conclusion with certainty:
the euro credit boom is unraveling, and sovereign debt levels are unsustainable in their
present form.
Perhaps the most visible sign of systemic, debt-related stress is the series of bailouts
financed by the European Union and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The EU
and IMF have provided C85, C110, and C78 billion to Ireland, Greece, and Portugal re-
spectively since the crisis began.21 The trend has been to pair international assistance with
agreed austerity measures. 22 On May 9, 2010, the EU states created the European Finan-
cial Stability Facility (EFSF) as an alternative method of financial assistance. 23 The EFSF
maturing this year alone. See Mark Deen & Paul Dobson, French Debt Costs Rise at Bond Sale as AAA Decision
Looms, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 5, 2012, 11:14 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-04/france-takes-
market-pulse-with-bond-offering-as-aaa-rating-decision-looms.html.
14. General Government Gross Debt, EUROSTAT, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&
init=1&language=en&pcode=tsieb090&plugin=I (last visited June 28, 2012).
15. Douglas Sutherland, Peter Hoeller, & Rossana Merola, Fiscal Consolidation: Part 1. How Much is Needed




17. Jagadeesh Gokhale, Measuring the Unfinded Obligations of European Countries, NCPA POLICY REP., no.
319, Jan. 2009, at 1.
18. Id. at 8.
19. Press Release, Eurostat, Provision of Deficit and Debt Data for 2010, at 5 (April 26, 2011), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=STAT/I 1/60&type=HTML.
20. Gokhale, supra note 17, at 8
21. Portugal Reaches Deal on EUR 78bn EU-IMF Bailout, EUBUSINESS (May 3, 2011, 10:50 PM), http://
www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/portugal-eurozone. 9 rq.
22. Id.
23. See About EFSF, EUR. FIN. STABILITY FACILITY, http://www.efsf.europa.eu/about/index.hun (last vis-
ited Jan. 16, 2012).
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is empowered to provide loans to EU nations in trouble, buy bonds on the market, indi-
rectly refinance banks via loans to governments, and issue its own bonds. 24
Despite its AAA rating, the basic problem with the EFSF is that the debt-laden Euro-
pean nations fund it.25 Earlier this year, Moody's warned France that by choosing to back
the EFSF, it was at greater risk of a downgrade because of the additional liability.26 Con-
versely, now that France and several other EU nations have just been downgraded by
ratings agency Standard & Poors (S&P), the EFSF is now, itself, threatened with a down-
grade-a move that sharply reduces the capital available for its operations.27 So far, S&P
is the only ratings agency to act on this threat, when it downgraded the EFSF to AA+ in
January.28 The agency said the move was "inevitable" after the downgrades to France and
Austria.2 9 The EFSF is not, itself, the solution to the debt crisis, because as far as the
markets are concerned, the health of the EFSF and EU nations is a two-way street.
C. THE BANKING SECTOR
1. Risky Sovereign Bond Holdings
Sovereign debt and financial instability in the banking sector go hand in hand. The
largest European banks, even in the supposedly more solvent North, are flush with both
national and foreign government bonds. 30 Until the crisis hit, banks purchased these
bonds en masse as a safety bet, with virtually no one questioning a government's ability to
pay.31 But now, in light of unprecedented national debts and an economic downturn, the
threat of a downgrade is pervasive. 32 A sovereign's downgrade not only reduces portfolio
value of government bond-holders who are holding riskier assets, it also negatively im-
pacts national banks by extension. 33 Data from the Bank of International Settlements
(BIS) indicates that a bank's fortunes generally rise and fall along with its home country:
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. John Glover, France Risks AAA on Expanded EFSF Bailout Fund: Euro Credit, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 18,
2011, 10:12 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-17/france-risks-losing-top-grade-as-efsf-
bailout-fund-bulks-up-euro-credit.html.
27. See Emily Gosden, Eurozone Rescue Fund Faces Loss of AAA rating, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 14, 2012, 8:30 PM),
http://www.telegTaph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/9015261/Eurozone-rescue-fund-faces-loss-of-AAA-
rating.html.
28. Luke Baker, S&P Downgrades Euro Zone's EFSF Bailout Fund, RELUFERS (Jan. 16, 2012, 6:05 PM), http:/
/www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/16/us-eurozone-efsf-sp-idUSTRE80F1OV20120116.
29. Id.
30. The New York Times published an interactive map that gives a good overview of the tangled web of
sovereign debt held by foreign national banks. Bill Marsh, It's All Connected: An Overview of the Euro Crisis,
N.Y. ToMES, Oct. 22, 2011, at SR7, available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/10/23/sunday-re-
view/an-overview-of-the-euro-crisis.html.
31. Fabio Panetta, Chairman, Study Group for Committee on the Global Financial Settlement, Bank for
International Settlements, The Impact of Sovereign Credit Risk on Bank Funding Conditions, CFGS PAPERS, no.
43, July 2011, at 30 [hereinafter BIS Report].
32. See Press Release, Standard & Poor's, Standard & Poor's Puts Ratings on Eurozone Sovereigns on
CreditWatch With Negative Implications (Dec. 5, 2011), available at http://www.standardandpoors.com/rat-
ings/articles/en/us/?articleType=HTML&assetID= 1245325380247.
33. BIS Report, supra note 31, at 20-21.
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all major "domestic banks are rated at or below their sovereign," and 64 percent of domes-
tic banks experienced a downgrade within six months of their sovereign's downgrade.
34
Consider the following trends in the sovereign bond market to see how these risks play
out. Since 2009, Spain has seen its ratings slashed three times in three years. 3s As a result,
its cost of borrowing has risen to more than double that of Germany. 36 Even worse, the
downgrades to Portugal, Ireland, and Greece have put their bonds at "junk status" (that is,
the bonds are no longer considered investment grade quality because their issuers are a
credit risk), and the consequences continue to be felt. 37 In November 2010, LCH
Clearnet (the largest clearinghouse in Europe) boosted margin requirement on Irish
bonds to 45 percent, forcing investors to put up huge deposits on the risky bonds. 38
Greece, struggling to come up with the cash to pay C14 billion of debt maturing March
2012, created a plan to give private bond-holders a 50 percent haircut (i.e., a write down
of the bond's value), later raising the rate to 70 percent. 39
The larger economies of Europe are not immune from this problem. Just days before
the EU December 2011 summit, S&P put fifteen Eurozone nations on a negative credit
rating watch-list, including AAA nations like Germany.40 S&P's cited a number of factors
for the move, including: a credit crunch, rising sovereign yields, political intransigence,
high public and private debt, and the likelihood of recession and slacking productivity in
2012.41 Fears of contagion reaching Europe's core nations crystallized on January 13,
when the S&P downgraded credit ratings on the government debt of nine out of the
sixteen European nations on the watch-list.42 Cyprus, Italy, Portugal, and Spain fared the
worst, with a two-notch hit, while France, Austria, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia all fell by
one notch.43
In light of rampant sovereign credit risk and the threat of downgrades, banks (and, of
course, private investors) have taken stock of their exposure to sovereign debt.44 Govern-
34. Id. at 21.
35. Emma Ross-Thomas, Spain's Credit Rating Cut by S&P Amid Concern Europe Debt Crisis Worsening,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 14, 2011, 2:29 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-13/spain-cut-to-aa-from-
aa-by-s-p-outlook-negative.html.
36. Id.
37. David Jolly, Portugal Downgrade Hurts Stocks in Europe, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 24, 2011, at B4; Dan O'Brien
& Laura Slattery, Irish Credit Rating Cut to Junk Status by Moody's, IRISH TIMES, July 13, 2011, at 16.
38. Paul Dobson, LCH Clearnet Says Ertra Margin for Irish Bonds Will Increase to 45 Percent, BLOOMBERG
(Nov. 25, 2010, 2:57 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-25lch-clearnet-says-extra-margin-
for-irish-bonds-will-increase-to-45-percent.html.
39. Kerin Hope, Alex Barker & Quentin Peel, Greece Takes Step Closer to Default, FIN. TIMEs, Feb. 5, 2012,
at 8; Costas Paris & Stelios Bouras, Greece Debt Negotiations Move Toward Deal, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2012, at
A9. In practice, these rates will likely be much higher. See Marc Chandler, European Bond Supply and Greece's
Trojan Horse, Bus. INSIDER (Jan. 6, 2012 11:36 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/european-bond-supply-
and-greeces-trojan-horse- 2 0 12 -1 (projecting that, with a coupon rate of 4 percent, the net present value of a
50 percent haircut is pushed up to 70 percent).
40. Standard & Poor's Puts Ratings, supra note 32.
41. Id.
42. Press Release, Standard & Poor's, Standard & Poor's Takes Various Rating Actions On 16 Eurozone
Sovereign Governments (Jan. 13, 2012), available at http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/articles/en/us/
?articleType=HTML&assetlD=1 245327294763.
43. Id.
44. See generally BIS Report, supra note 31.
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ment issued bonds comprise about 60 percent of the European bond market.45 Banks
have scrambled to rid themselves of sovereign bonds. 46 This trend puts more pressure on
governments and coincides with burgeoning public deficits and debts (as previously dis-
cussed). Perhaps the single greatest threat to the European banks is a government default-
ing on its debt. Because of the level of exposure to foreign sovereign debt, and the
interdependence this creates within the Eurozone, the default of one nation, or the bust of
a major national bank, could have a cascading effect.47 A run on banks and the threat of
contagion is the end-game EU leaders fear the most because it cuts to the core of the
Eurozone. 4s The impetus to prevent contagion, or a spillover effect, helps to explain the
recent actions of EU politicians that are the focus of this comment's later sections.
The French national banks make for an interesting case study of bank exposure to the
sovereign bond market. Prior to the crisis, French banks invested heavily in Italian debt,
with little incentive to diversify their portfolios.49 As a consequence, today France is ex-
posed to C416 billion of Italian sovereign bonds-107 billion of which is held by the
public sector.5 0 At the end of 2010, half the capital of BNP Paribas was C28 billion of
Italian bonds51 Collectively, France's financial institutions are exposed to the weaker
economies of Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, and Spain to a tune of over C680 billion (an
amount that equals more than a quarter of France's GDP).5 2
French banks now face the uncomfortable task of slowly deleveraging and diversifying.
In the past nine months BNP Paribas slashed C7 billion of bonds, shedding more bonds
from its books than any other European bank.53 But this bank alone held C28.7 billion
worth of "GIIPS" or "PIIGS" bonds as of the end of September.5 4 "PRIGS" is the unflat-
tering moniker that refers to the fiscally weaker Eurozone nations of Portugal, Ireland,
Italy, Greece, and Spain, who received a C750 billion package from the EU on May 10,
2010 in the initial phases of the Eurozone debt crisis.55
Additionally, French banks must now juggle domestic stressors. On December 16,
2011, Fitch Ratings downgraded France's credit rating citing its "heightened risk of con-
tingent liabilities."5 6 On January 13, S&P followed suit, lowering France to AA+.5 7 Thus,
45. Bond Markets and Prices, AFME/INAXSTING BONDS EUR., http://www.investinginbondseurope.org/
Pages/BondMarketsAndPrices.aspx?folder.id=510 (last visited Jan. 16, 2012).
46. Patrick Jenkins, Martin Stabe, & Stanley Pignal, EU Banks Slash Sovereign Holdings, FIN. TIMES (Dec.
9, 2011, 6:51 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a6d2fd4e-228f-Ilel-acdc-OO144feabdcO.html#axzz
ljSYDb4Lg.
47. Gary North, French Fried Banks, LEwRocKWELL.COM (Dec. 2, 2011), http://1ewrockwell.com/north/
north1068.html.
48. Id.
49. Nelson D. Schwartz & Liz Alderman, In Paris, Keeping a Watchfid Eye on Rome's Troubled Finances, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 14, 2011, at B1.
50. Augustino Fontevecchia, French Banks Won't Be Able To Handle Inevitable Italian Restructuring, FORBES
(Dec. 21, 2011, 6:01 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2011/12/21/french-banks-wont-be-
able-to-handle-inevitable-italian-restructuring/.
51. Landon Thomas, Jr., Pain Builds in Europe's Sovereign Debt Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2011, at Bl.
52. Deen & Dobson, supra note 13; Fontevecchia, supra note 50.
53. Jenkins, supra note 46.
54. Id.
55. See Charlemagne, Europe's 750 billion Euro Bazooka, ECONOMIST: CHARLEMAGNE'S NOTEBOOK (May
10, 2010, 12:26 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2010/05/euro-crisis-2?page=l.
56. Deen & Dobson, supra note 13.
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while French banks are taking steps to limit their exposure to the Eurozone periphery,
their fate remains largely intertwined with nations like Italy and Spain, and domestic trou-
bles complicate the deleveraging process. Bear in mind France's predicament in the fol-
lowing discussions on recent developments within the Eurozone.
2. Risky Business
The banking sector has set itself up for failure. The past decades have seen a surge in
financial innovations and services in the securities market (i.e., credit default swaps and
derivatives trading). Ironically, securitization was originally introduced as a way of reduc-
ing risk by chopping up interests in an original loan and selling them to a diverse pool of
investors. 58 But instead of banks directly selling these interests to investors, they soon
realized the incredible profits available by repackaging and reselling these securities to
fellow banks and investment funds, using increasingly complex methods of packaging and
valuating.59 These trades internal to the financial industry created swollen profits that far
surpassed the actual worth of the underlying assets of the securities. Thus, leading up to
the crisis, "activities internal to the banking system [grew] far more rapidly than end ser-
vices to the real economy."60
Other major problems were inadequate capital requirements and increased leveraging
(that is, banks took on significantly greater debts or risks than they had equity). Essen-
tially, leverage is the ability to control large amounts of money by putting up relatively
little of one's own money as a margin and financing the rest. In a booming economy,
leverage can amplify profits by providing more resources to make profitable invest-
ments-for example, using a loan to finance a venture. Conversely, when investments go
south or the economy flags, leverage amplifies losses. In the 2000s, banks financed in-
creasingly large debts, without a corresponding increase in equity, and took on greater and
greater leverage and risk.61 In the case of securities, the true risks and leverage ratios were
imperfectly understood, due to the complex packaging and valuation methods, or masked
by using off-the-books mechanisms (such as "structured investment vehicles" which are
not reported on a bank's balance sheet). 62
A century ago, a typical European bank leveraged assets-to-capital at a four-to-one ra-
tio.63 Leading up to the crisis, the leverage ratios of some European banks were over fifty-
to-one.64 These risks are astronomical. If a bank is leveraged at twenty five-to-one, just a
4 percent decline in value of the bank's assets would wipe out all of its equity.65 And the
57. Press Release, Standard & Poor's, France's Unsolicited Long-Term Ratings Lowered To 'AA; Outlook
Negative (Jan. 13, 2012), available athttp://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/articles/en/eu/?articleType=
HTML&assetID=1245327295020.
58. F'NjciAL SERVICES ATrrHORTY, TURNER REVIEW 15 (2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/
pubs/other/turnerreview.pdf.
59. Id. at 16.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 20.
62. Id. at 19-20.
63. Niall Ferguson, The Descent of Finance, HAIRv. Bus. REv., July-Aug. 2009, at 3.
64. Ben Chu, Banks Must Report Leverage Ratios by 2013, Warns New Super-Regulator, INDEP. (Dec. 2,2011),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/banks-must-report-leverage-ratios-by-2013-warns-new-
superregulator-6270822.html.
65. Ferguson, supra note 63, at 3.
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securities and derivative swaps were very risky assets to be traded at these levels. Addi-
tionally, inadequate capital requirements left banks exposed to massive credit and trading
losses that they were unable to absorb once these investments bottomed out.
66
3. Illiquid Assets & Accounting Rules
Risky sovereign debt and risky business practices are not the only major problems
plaguing the banking sector: the current accounting rules in Europe (as well as the United
States) almost completely mask which banks are operating on junk portfolios. To under-
stand how, a little background information may be useful. For accounting purposes, banks
generally classify assets under one of two books: the trading, or available-for-sale portfolio
(AFS), and the held-to-maturity portfolio (HTM).67 An AFS asset must be "marked to
market," that is, its listed value must reflect the current price it would fetch on the open
market if sold (fair value). 68 But an HTM asset is measured by the amortized cost, or face
value, thus insulating it from any market fluctuations. 69 Consider one illustration: a bank
invests in and holds a piece of real estate originally purchased for C200,000. There is an
economic downturn, and the market value of the property drops to C100,000. If the appli-
cable accounting regulations force banks to classify the real estate as an AFS asset, the
bank's balance sheet must list the asset as worth C100,000. In contrast, if the rules allow
the bank to classify the property as an HTM asset, the balance sheet will list the asset as
worth C200,000, despite the market fluctuation.
Before the 2008 financial crisis, banks following International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS) did not have the option to reclassify securities (i.e., trading assets, by
moving them out of the AFS portfolio). 70 International Accounting Standard (IAS) 39
contained this flat prohibition: "an entity shall not reclassify a financial instrument into or
out of the fair value through profit or loss category while it is held or issued." 71
Then, in 2008, the Lehman Brothers collapse sent shock waves through the financial
sectors. Banks were desperate to avoid reporting severe losses (and therefore sharp reduc-
tions of capital). Shortly thereafter, the International Accounting Standards Board
(IASB), bypassing typical due process procedures, amended IAS 39 to weaken the fair-
value accounting rules and permit the reclassification of assets from AFS to HTM.72
Moreover, the changes applied retroactively, allowing banks to reclassify assets from July
2008 onward.73 The retroactive date enabled banks to snatch up assets that otherwise
would have reflected the shock of the 2008 financial crisis. Former chair of the IASB, Sir
David Tweedie, candidly admitted that the amendment was a direct result of intense polit-
66. See Crisis Worse Than 2008 in Europe as Rescue Options Dim, Gordon Brown Says, BLOOMBERG (Sep. 16,
2011, 3:05 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-09-16/european-banks-grossly-under-capitalized-
amid-debt-crisis-brown-says.html.
67. History oflAS 39, IAS PLus, http://www.iasplus.com/standard/ias39.htm (last visited March 3, 2012).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. INT'L ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., RECLASSIFICATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS: AMENDMENTS TO
1AS 39 AND IFRS 7 4-5 (2008), available at http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/BE8B72FB-B7B8-49D9-
95A3-CE2BDCFB915F/0/AmdmentsIAS39andIFRS7.pdf [hereinafter LAS 39 AMENDMENTS].
71. Id.
72. Id.; Marie Leone, "Spineless?" UK Pressure Targets Fair Value Weakening, CFO (Nov. 11, 2008), http://
www.cfo.com/article.cfm/12586836.
73. ]AS 39 AMENDMENTS, supra note 70, at 6.
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ical pressure exerted by the European Commission. 74 The Commission had made it clear
they were ready to legislate around the IASB, and "carve out" IAS 39. Tweedie, who
considered resigning over the incident, called the move a "blunt threat to blow the [IASB]
away." 75 Overnight, European banks drew a curtain over massive amounts of mal-
investment.
Under this new framework, a bank can create the illusion that a bad loan or bad invest-
ment is still performing. 76 Theoretically, it is even possible for a bank to operate on the
spread from depositors and borrowers, meanwhile shelving its mal-investments that it
cannot rid from the balance sheet without either writing them off or down. In light of
these accounting issues, how can one accurately measure the health of the European
banks? Although there is no way to be certain of the banks' true condition under the
current accounting regulations, there are two alarm bells to keep in mind: (1) the U.S.
banking system by analogy, and (2) the European banks' unexpectedly voracious reaction
to the ECB's newly offered lines of credit.
U.S. accounting rules allow for transfers between portfolios similar to amended IAS
39.77 When the financial crisis of 2008 struck, Congress approved the $700 billion TARP
bailout for the banks. The true cost of the bailout, however, was revealed by the GAO's
partial audit of the Federal Reserve. It turns out that Wall Street (as well as some foreign
banks) received $16 trillion worth of undisclosed, unrecorded loans in 2008.78 This gives
us an idea of the systemic levels of mal-investment U.S. banks' balance sheets, and sug-
gests that the Federal Reserve feared that acting publicly could create a panic. The other
troubling indicator is the number of European banks who leaped at the newly offered
ECB lines of credit in December 2011. 79 Economists predicted that roughly C293 billion
of loans would be issued.80 Instead, 523 banks borrowed C489 billion in the largest-ever
single operation by the ECB.81 The second round of loans eclipsed this number. At the
end of February 2011, over 800 banks had borrowed C529 billion from the ECB.82 The
scramble may have reflected the banks' desperation to repair their balance sheets.
Moreover, banks have other ways of beefing up their balance sheets. For example,
banks routinely issue their own stocks and bonds to fellow financial institutions and pri-
74. Leone, supra note 72.
75. Id.
76. See Howard Mustoe, Flawed Rules Added to Bank Losses in Crisis, Pension Group Says, BLOOMBERG (Nov.
30, 2011, 6:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-01/flawed-rules-added-to-bank-losses-in-cri-
sis-pension-group-says.html.
77. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157: Fair Value Measurements, FiN. AccT. STANDARDS
BD., Sept. 2006, at 2-3, 9, available at http://www.fasb.org/st/summary/stsuml57.shtml.
78. Phil Kuntz & Bob Ivry, Fed Once-Secret Loan Crisis Data Compiled by Bloomberg Released to Public,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 22, 2011, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-23/fed-s-once-secret-
data-compiled-by-bloomberg-released-to-public.html.
79. Gabi Thesing & Rainer Buergin, ECB to Lend Greater-Than-Forecast $645 Billion as Banks Line Up for




82. Stephanie Flanders, Who is the ECB Helping?, BBC NEWS (Feb. 29, 2012, 11:53 AM), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-17213302.
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vate investors.8 3 In distressed markets, if the value of these bonds goes down, the bank can
record the difference in value as income. So, if a C10,000 bank bond declines in value to
C8,000, the bank may list a C2,000 income, even though it must eventually repay the
investor. Lehman Brothers also infamously used British accounting tricks to temporarily
remove $50 billion of assets from its books before its quarterly reports. 84 While such
maneuvers temporarily make the balance sheet look healthier, they do very little in terms of
true growth. Connecting the dots reveals Europe's dirty little secret: the real problem in
the banking sector is not liquidity, its solvency!
4. The Interplay between Bank Instability and Sovereign Instability
Note the dilemma: even if a country like Germany wanted to raise money to bail out a
fellow EU member, it would have to borrow from its own banks, who are themselves
saddled with well over a C100 billion worth of mal-mvestment and "PIIGS" bonds that are
not even marked to market. 85 If a government defaults on its debt, banks holding sover-
eign bonds of that government will be forced to write them off as a loss-the illusion of
value as an HTM asset lost. Such a move could easily trigger a panic or run on the banks
depending on the level of exposure.
Unfortunately, all of these factors feed upon each other and manifest in market volatil-
ity as investors grow anxious. Take, for example, one recent trend: the rising yields on
government issued bonds. Surging yields can create a vicious cycle. As bankers become
increasingly worried about a country's ability to pay its debts long-term, the demanded
price for lending rises. As the cost of borrowing rises for a government, it will have more
difficulty paying off its short-term debts. When the yields are high enough, the govern-
ment is forced to operate its budget on credit-card like rates. Then, in turn, when the
government's bond rates rise, the value of bank's portfolio containing those bonds will
fall. Finally, the banks protect themselves by selectively issuing credit, which can hurt
businesses, slow growth, and so on. Volatile yield trends are one indication that a crisis of
confidence is developing.86
M. ECB Banking Regulations: Internal Reforms
In light of this background information on the scope and character of the Eurozone
crisis, one can critically evaluate the banking sector's response. The ECB is a logical
starting point for tackling this question. The ECB is capitalized by the European System
of Central Banks and the various European National Central Banks, in proportion to their
83. See, e.g., Financial Accounting Standards Board., Statement of Financial Accounting No. 159: The Fair
Value Option for Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities, FIN. Accr. SEIES, no. 289-A, Feb. 2007, at 51.
84. See Michael J. de LI Merced & Andrew R. Sorkin, Lehman Bros. Hid Borrowing, Examiner Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2010, at Al.
85. See Marsh, supra note 30. Greece is a special exception to this problem, as it negotiated write-downs in
its bonds' value with creditors in early 2012. See Associated Press, Summary Box: S&P Upgrades Greece after
Writedown, YAHOo! NEWS (May 2, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/summary-box-p-upgrades-greece-
writedown-174500221-finance.hmnl.
86. See Michael Snyder, The Yield Curve for Italian Bonds is Turning Upside Down, SEEKING ALPHA (Nov. 10,
2011), http://seekingalpha.com/article/306880-the-yield-curve-for-italian-bonds-is-turning-upside-down.
SUMMER 2012
770 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
respective populations and GDP.87 In December 2010, the ECB gave its capital levels
(now, upwards of C10 trillion) a boost.8s The ECB is perhaps the only institution that can
credibly put up enough capital to purchase government bonds en masse, similar to the
Federal Reserve's quantitative easing strategy (i.e., printing the money and buying up the
bonds directly).8 9
In 2009, the ECB began to amend and supplement its existing legal framework in light
of the sovereign debt crisis. 90 Some of the changes are temporary stopgap measures.
Others are permanent amendments. These reforms, which are already in effect, demon-
strate that the ECB is waging a multi-front battle. Notably, the national central banks
within the Eurosystem are meant to comply with these policies. 91 The following provides
an overview of the recent changes and some analysis of their role in the crisis
management.
A. REFORMS TO MONETARY POLICY INSTRUMENTS AND PROCEDURES
One of the clear focal points of reform is banks' treatment of asset-backed securities. In
particular, the new guidelines strengthen risk assessment mechanisms. One of the goals of
risk-assessment is to ensure there is adequate collateral behind credit operations. 92 Under
the new reforms, a debt instrument eligible to be an asset underlying a credit operation
(i.e., "cash flow generating assets backing the asset-backed securities") "must not consist,
in whole or in part, . . . of tranches of other asset-backed securities ... of credit-linked
notes, swaps or other derivatives instruments."93 This is a clear response to the tranches
of mortgage-backed securities that wreaked havoc in 2008.
Likewise, the ECB retooled the credit assessment framework for asset-backed securi-
ties. For those asset-backed securities that are eligible, the ECB now applies a stringent
credit assessment. To meet the credit quality threshold (that is, the minimum criteria for
high credit standards), the asset should (1) have a "triple A" assessment at issuance and (2)
maintain a minimum rating of "single A" over the life of the asset.94 Securities issued on
or after March 1, 2011 must undergo two separate credit assessments, both of which must
87. EUR. CENT. BANK, LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE EUROSYSTEM AND THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF CEN-
TRAL BANKS: ECB LEGAL AcTs AND INSTRUMENTS 2011 UPDATE 6 (2011), available at http://www.ecb.int/
pub/pdf/other/legalframeworkeurosystemescb201 Ien.pdf.
88. Id.
89. See Ben Baden, W'by More Quantitative Easing Could Be a Mistake, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 13, 2010), http://
money.usnews.com/money/business-economy/articles/2010/10/13/why-more-quantitative-easing-could-be-
a-mistake.
90. See, e.g., Decision ECB/2009/27, of the European Central Bank of 14 December 2009 Amending Deci-
sion ECB/2001/16 on the Allocation of Monetary Income of the National Central Banks of Participating
Member States from the Fiscal Year 2002, 2009 Oj. (L 339) 55, 55.
91. See id.
92. See Protocol (No. 4), on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European
Central Bank, art. 18.1, 2010 Oj. (C 83) 230, 238.
93. Guideline ECB/2010/13, of the European Central Bank of 16 September 2010 Amending Guideline
ECB/2000/7 on Monetary Policy Instruments and Procedures of the Eurosystem, 2010 Oj. (L 267) 21, 30.
94. Id. at 35.
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meet the credit quality threshold.95 Other reforms are discretionary provisions, and pro-
vide banks with ways to demand assurances of a counter-party's financial solvency. 96
The ECB also addressed bank bonds as a source of risk. To "safeguard the Eurosystem
against credit exposure," the ECB limited the issuance of uncovered bank bonds as collat-
eral assigned to a counter-party. 97 The bonds should only make up 10 percent of the total
collateral. But government guaranteed uncovered bank bonds are exempt.98 Notably, this
limitation fails to address the accounting games banks play when they record declining
bond values as income.99
To ease some of the pressure on banks, the ECB has also broadened the scope of accept-
able collateral that counter-parties may use to obtain credit.100 Fixed-term deposits (i.e., a
deposit that must remain at the bank until its maturity, which is usually a few months or
years) now qualify as non-marketable assets, in addition to credit claims and non-marketa-
ble retail mortgage-backed debt instruments (RMBDs).101 In 2008, the ECB temporarily
expanded eligible collateral to include (1) collateral denominated in U.S. dollars, British
pounds sterling, or Japanese yen; (2) syndicated loans; (3) debt instruments issued by
credit institutions and traded on non-regulated markets; (4) collateral (excluding asset-
backed securities) with a "BBB-" credit assessment; and (5) subordinated assets, so long as
a financially sound guarantor provides an irrevocable guarantee. 10 2 These emergency
measures were originally set to expire in December 2009, but the ECB elected to extend
them until December 2010.103 If the economy worsens, the ECB could easily run similar
programs in the future.
Another set of reforms touches on the application of minimum reserves. A 2003 regula-
tion details the requirements of minimum reserves for credit institutions and empowers
the ECB to make exemptions.104 A 2008 amendment specifies the types of institutions the
ECB may exempt under this power, including: institutions undergoing reorganization,
institutions whose funds have been frozen by the state, and miscellaneous institutions that
the ECB deems would not benefit from the minimum reserves requirement. 05 This last
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., id. at 30 (stating "[t]o decide whether its rights are adequately protected against claw back
rules, the Eurosystem may require other documents, including a solvency certificate from the transferee, for
the suspect period").
97. Guideline ECB/2009/1, of the European Central Bank of 20 January 2009 Amending Guideline ECB/
2000/7 on Monetary Policy Instruments and Procedures of the Eurosystem, 2009 O.J. (L 36) 59, 59-60.
98. Id. at 60.
99. Id.
100. Guideline ECB/2010/30, of the European Central Bank of 13 December 2010 amending Guideline
ECB/2000/7 on Monetary Policy Instruments and Procedures of the Eurosystem, 2010 OJ. (L 336) 63, 63,
65.
101. Id. at 65.
102. Guideline ECB/2008/18, of the European Central Bank of 21 November 2008 on Temporary Changes
to the Rules Relating to Eligibility of Collateral, 2008 O.J. (L 314) 14, 14-15.
103. Guideline ECB/2009/24, of the European Central Bank of 10 December 2009 Amending Guideline
ECB/2008/18, 2009 OJ. (L 330) 95, 95.
104. Regulation 1745/2003, of the European Central Bank of 12 September 2003 on the Application of
Minimum Reserves, 2003 OJ. (L 250) 10, 10-12 (EC).
105. Regulation 1052/2008, of the European Central Bank of 22 October 2008 Amending Regulation (EC)
No 1745/2003 on the Application of Minimum Reserves, 2008 O.J. (L 282) 14, 14-16 (EC).
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category in particular should give the ECB broad flexibility in terms of how it chooses to
treat banks in financial straits.
B. EXTERNAL MEASURES: THE CBPP & SMP
On May 7, 2009, the ECB announced it would launch the Covered Bond Purchase
Program (CBPP), whereby it would take the extraordinary step of direct market interven-
tion.t 0 6 Under the program, the ECB conducted outright purchases of covered bonds up
to C60 billion over the course of a year.'0 7 Covered bonds are the brainchild of the
Eurozone, which invented them. The covered bond is a debt security backed by a pool of
various loans (typically mortgages or public sector loans). Of the 422 bonds purchased, 27
percent were from the primary market and 73 percent from the secondary market.108
The stated goals of CBPP were to (1) assist the decline in money market term rates, (2)
ease funding conditions for financial institutions, (3) encourage credit institutions to
maintain or expand lending, and (4) improve liquidity in the private debt securities mar-
ket. 109 Essentially, this amounts to a kind of miniature, or indirect, quantitative easing,
whereby the ECB scoops up mortgage-backed securities and public sector loans in order
to shore up bank funding." 0 The ECB launched a second round of bond purchases
(CBPP2) in November 2011, this time for C40 billion worth of bonds."'
The CBPP goes hand in hand with the Securities Market Program (SMP) launched in
2010.112 The SMP allows the ECB to buy up sovereign bonds on the secondary markets
(i.e., from other investors, and not directly from the governments)" 13 As of December
2011, the ECB made purchases worth C207 billion under the program. 114 Although the
ECB has not released any data on the composition of these purchases, the general consen-
sus is that the ECB has made targeted purchases of GIIPS bonds from the most distressed
regions of the Eurozone." 5
These programs are not without controversy. A few noteworthy German bank officials
actually resigned in protest over the programs.16 Critics of the bond-buying program
fear that the ECB will go a step further and engage in direct quantitative easing (i.e.,
106. John Beirne et al., The Impact of the Eurosystem's Covered Bond Purchase Programme on the Primary and









112. Decision ECB/2010/5, of the European Central Bank of 14 May 2010 Establishing a Securities Market
Programme, 2010 Oj. (L 124) 8, 8-9.
113. Id.
114. E.C.B. Slowed Purchases of Government Bonds, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/1 2/06/business/globalecb-slowed-purchases-of-government-bonds.html.
115. Driven by the Markets? ECB Sovereign Bond Purchases and the Securities Markets Programme, at 5 (June 8,
2010), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/documentactivities/cont/201006/20100610ATT75796/
20100610ATT75796EN.pdf (by Ansgar Belke).
116. ECB Mulling Alternatives to Bond-Buy Plan: Nowotny, REUTERS, Jan. 17, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/
article/2012/01/1 7/us-ecb-nowomy-idUSTRE8OG23R20120117.
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printing money).117 They believe these market interventions on the ECB's part under-
mine the bank's political independence and focus on price stability."5 Others consider
these interventions as tantamount to quantitative easing.'n 9 To counter these accusations,
the ECB is currently attempting to "sterilize" the purchased bonds (i.e., counter-balance
the purchases by having banks deposit the same amount the ECB has spent).120
Another source of contention is the way the SMP redistributes risk. The ECB assumes
the liabilities from the bonds when it makes these purchases. 121 In the event of a sover-
eign default, the ECB ultimately would have to pay the losses on these bonds-thus shift-
ing the risk to the other NCB's who actually capitalize the ECB. 122 Small wonder the
German bankers protested. Currently, the ECB is weighing its options and looking for
alternatives to the bond-buying program. 123
C. THE REFORMS IN PERSPECTIVE
The obvious criticism of the reforms to monetary policies and instruments is that they
are largely reactionary and likely too little too late. Stricter credit-assessment safeguards
may help avert a future crisis, but they do not address the massive amounts of mal-invest-
ment already on the books. As long as banks and governments are unwilling to liquidate
this debt, the balance sheets of European banks will remain in disrepair. Banks will con-
tinue to use creative accounting measures to mask the under-performing or illiquid assets.
Ultimately, the CBPP and SMP amount to creative methods of putting out fires.
Thanks to ECB's ability to purchase sovereign bonds, banks have been able to deleverage
sovereign debt, shedding risky bonds from their books more quickly than they would oth-
erwise be able to on the open market.124 But the downside to this strategy is that banks
are becoming increasingly dependent on the ECB to meet their short-term funding
needs. 125 Bolstering funding is more like a shot of adrenaline than a cure-it keeps the
banks functioning at the status quo for the short term, but it does not treat the underlying
problems of insolvency and debt.
In fact, the banks' own debt will present yet another huge obstacle in 2012.126 Consider
the growing deficit between newly issued bank bonds, and maturing ones: (1) in 2010 the
difference was C33 billion; (b) in 2011, that number leapt to a C1 10 billion that the ECB
helped to finance; and (c) in 2012, there is C802 billion worth of maturing debt.127 The
ninety largest banks in Europe will need to roll nearly C5 trillion of debt in the next
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Belke, supra note 115, at 6-7 (noting that the key aspect of QE has been targeted interventions in bond
markets to get market interest rates down-precisely what the ECB is now doing via the SMP).
120. E.C.B. Slowed Purchases of Government Bonds, supra note 114.
121. Belke, supra note 115, at 5.
122. Id. at 6.
123. ECB Mulling Alternatives, supra note 116.
124. See Jenkins, supra note 46.
125. See Art Pamaude, ECH to Bolster Funding for Banks Amid Crisis, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 27, 2011), http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203687504576654964208422064.html.
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twenty-four months. 128 This amount equals 51 percent of the Eurozone's GDP. 129 The
ECB's purchase programs may help cushion the blow of immediately maturing debt, but
the funding from these programs is a drop in the bucket compared to the banks' true
short-term funding needs.
The programs target the most distressed markets, and may be useful in terms of allevi-
ating immediate pressures (i.e., rising yields). But they are not a real solution, per se.
They do not address the underlying structural imbalances in Europe of diverging compet-
itiveness, fiscal insolvency, and burgeoning debts. True, the ECB is not necessarily re-
sponsible for fixing Europe-structural changes should be implemented at the legislative
level.
IV. Latest Developments and Structural Reforms
A. NOVEMBER 2011: EMERGENCY U.S. DOLLAR LoANs
In November 2011, Europe was at a tipping point, and Italy was the culprit. Italian
sovereign debt stood at C1.9 trillion-an amount greater than the collective sovereign
debt of Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Greece. 130 Its debt to GDP ratio was correspond-
ingly high at 120% (the largest in Europe after Greece). 13' At these figures, Italy required
a primary surplus of 5 percent GDP simply to stabilize its debt load-a difficult goal given
the current recession and Italy's newly imposed austerity measures. 132 Any restructuring
of Italian debt, however, would be a body-blow to the French banks, which (as previously
discussed) remain heavily exposed to Italian sovereign bonds. 133 On November 9, LCH
Clearnet triggered a panic when it posted a margin call against Italian government
bonds.' 34 Suddenly, banks trading Italian bonds, or using them as collateral "either had to
come up with billions of euros in extra cash or would have quickly had to sell some of their
holdings."135
The market increasingly echoed this tension as the price of Italian yields surged. As
previously discussed, soaring yields can trigger a vicious cycle for both banks and sover-
eigns. Even with the ECB "aggressively" buying up Italian bonds, investors continued to
sell off Italian bonds. 13 6 The recently announced haircuts to Greek bonds (at that time,
128. Peter Boone & Simon Johnson, Europe on the Brink, PETERSON INST. INT'L ECON., July 2011, at 4.
129. Id.
130. Fabio Benedetti-Valentini, Italy's Political Woes Spell 'Nightmare'for BNP, Agricole, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 9,
2011, 5:20 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-08/italy-political-woes-spell-nightnare-for-bnp-
credit-agricole.html.
131. Id.
132. Nouriel Roubini, Time to Act - Italy Must Restructure Its Debt Now, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2011, at 9.
133. See Benedetti-Valentini, supra note 130.
134. Rushing for the Exits, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 12, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/21538195.
Margin is the percentage of equity an investor personally puts into a margin account, usually allowing her to
invest with additional, borrowed money to amplify profits. See Margin Trading: The Dreaded Margin Call,
INVESTOPEDiA, htrp://www.investopedia.com/university/margin/margin2.asp#axzzlzldB6POO (last visited
July 22, 2012). When the value of the account drops, the broker makes a "margin call," forcing the investor
to either deposit more money into the account or sell some of the account's assets. Id.
135. Rushing for the Exits, supra note 134.
136. See Snyder, supra note 86.
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potentially 50 percent to private bondholders) did nothing to soothe the markets. 137 The
ripple effects were visible as Spanish, Belgian, Austrian, and French bonds also spiked.' 38
In November, Italian yields peaked at around 7.5%.139 These are the critical levels that
forced Portugal and Greece to ask the EU-IMF for a bailout.14° In Italy's case, however,
the cost of a bailout would be astronomically higher-the EU-IMF simply could not foot
the bill this time around. In the words of one credit strategist, "Italy is too big to fail and
too big to bail ... We don't have enough of a cushion in the European banking system to
take a meaningful haircut on Italian debt."141
The response came on November 30 when six central banks, including the Federal
Reserve and ECB, took "coordinated action." 142 The banks announced that starting De-
cember 5, (1) the current pricing of the U.S. dollar would drop fifty basis points, and (2)
the Fed would open up a new round of dollar swap lines.143 Originally, the existing swap
lines had been set to expire in August 2012, but, under this plan, they were extended until
February 1, 2013.144 This means that for an extended period of time the other central
banks can exchange their own currencies for cheap loans of U.S. dollars. 45 Then, these
central banks in turn may lend them to the various financial institutions of their countries
at auction. 146
Officially, the stated purpose of this coordinated move was to "ease strains in financial
markets and thereby mitigate the effects of such strains on the supply of credit to house-
holds and businesses and so help foster economic activity."1 47 There is good reason to be
skeptical. After the historic stimulus of 2008, when U.S. banks were flooded with cheap
capital, the money did not automatically flow back into to the private sector. 148 Why
should this time be any different? Rather, an analysis of these coordinated moves should
follow the money down the pipeline. The swap lines tell a different story than the expla-




139. Rushing for the Exits, supra note 134.
140. See Anchalee Worrachate, ECB Cash Averts 'Funding Crisis'for Italy, Spain, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 5, 2012,
4:39 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-05/ecb-cash-averts-funding-crisis-for-italy-spain-
euro-credit.hmnl.
141. Schwartz & Alderman, supra note 49.
142. Scott Lanman & Jeff Black, Central Banks Cut Cost of Borrowing Dollars to Ease Crisis, BLOOMBERG (Nov.
30, 2011, 3:25 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-30/fed-five-central-banks-lower-interest-
rate-on-dollar-swaps.html.
143. William Watts & Greg Robb, Fed, Central Banks Slash Dollar Borrowing Costs, MARKETWATcH (Nov.
30, 2011), http://articles.marketwatch.com/2011-11-30/economy/30755793-l-central-banks-swiss-national-
bank-bank-stress.
144. Lanman & Black, supra note 142.
145. Watts & Robb, supra note 143.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See John Wasik, It's Time for Banks to Pay Back Their Debt to the Rest of Us, REUTERS (July 29, 2011),
http://blogs.reuters.com/reuters-money/2011/07/29/its-time-for-banks-to-pay-back-their-debt-to-the-rest-
of-us/ (noting that consumer lending levels of 2009-2010 were $100 billion less than the pre-crisis levels in
2007).
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B. DECEMBER: LTRO AND THE EU SuMMrr
Shortly after the Fed opened the spigot on dollar swaps, the newly liquid ECB an-
nounced it would launch its "long-term refinancing operation" (LTRO).'49 Beginning
December 21, the ECB offered European banks a sweetheart deal: loans at 1 percent
financing with a three-year maturity.'50 The logic behind this is simple. The Fed loans
U.S. dollars to the ECB at fifty basis points. The ECB then loans these same dollars to
the various European banks at 1 percent. The hope, then, is that these European banks
will use these loans to purchase sovereign bonds-especially the highly yielding ones. If,
for example, a bank used this money to purchase a sovereign bond yielding at 7 percent, it
could report a 6 percent profit. This is what is referred to as a "carry trade."
As mentioned earlier, an unexpectedly voracious reaction by the banks followed. Over
500 banks borrowed over C400 billion under LTRO in December 2011, and over 800
banks borrowed over C500 billion in February 2012.151 In the short term, the strategy
seems to have worked. Italian and Spanish bonds have receded from critical levels.15 2
Banks have more profits to report. Consequently, it appears that the purpose of the dollar
swaps is not to assist "households and businesses" as claimed. Instead, it seems likely these
operations were specifically targeted to avert an imminent credit crunch, allowing Italy
and other periphery nations continued access to affordable credit, and to help the banks
repair their tattered balance sheets.
Although these coordinated maneuvers in the banking sector may have averted an im-
mediate funding crisis for Italy and Spain, significant problems are on the horizon. First,
these carry trades only kick the can down the road. Even with an injection of billions of
euros, European banks still have to roll trillions of euros of debt in the next two years. is 3
The strategy of borrowing from the ECB to grease the wheels for sovereign bond
purchases is not a sustainable one. First and foremost, the massive debt loads of both
banks and sovereigns must decelerate to sustainable levels. Otherwise, investor confi-
dence in the sovereign bond market will continue to erode. Even triple 'A' Germany has
felt the effects with a failed bond auction. 5 4 Second, these carry trades may cause more
damage in the long term. The trades strengthen the connections between and the inter-
dependence of sovereigns and banks, making each more exposed to "future shocks.' 55
Third, there is no guarantee the banks will actually use these loans to reinvest in the
sovereign bond market. As discussed, banks have largely tried to deleverage in the past
year. It may be more attractive to them to invest in safer, even if less profitable, yielding
149. See Press Release, Eur. Cent. Bank, ECB Announces Measures to Support Bank Lending and Money
Market Activity (Dec. 8, 2011), http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2011/html/pr 1I1208_l.en.htrnl.
150. Id.
151. See Thesing & Buergin, supra note 79; Flanders, supra note 82.
152. Worrachate, supra note 140.
153. Boone & Johnson, supra note 128.
154. See Paul Dobson, German Auction 'Disaster' Stirs Crisis Concern, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 23, 2011, 11:11
AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-23/germany-fails-to-receive-bids-for-35-of-10-year-bunds-
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bonds like those of Germany. Or they may be entirely focused on using the funds to
refinance and roll over their massive debt loads.' t6
The ECB timed its announcement of LTRO to coincide with the EU December 9
summit. This summit marked a major shift in Europe's political and legal trajectory.
Germany and France pushed for fundamental changes to the EU treaty, whereby the
European Commission could police national finances. The plan called for prior EU ap-
proval of national budget plans, as well as automatic sanctions for countries that over-
spend.' 5 7 David Cameron, unable to secure a U.K. waiver for the more stringent financial
measures, took the extraordinary step of vetoing the treaty changes. 15s Undaunted, Ger-
many and France proposed that the changes be implemented via inter-governmental
treaty instead.)59 The plan required a significant abdication of national sovereignty-ulti-
mate control over national finance. Perhaps emboldened by the United Kingdom, the
Czech Republic, Sweden, and Hungary have also expressed their hesitation. 160
Recently, Angela Merkel provided insight on what the new EU might look like under
the treaty:
"Over a long process, we will transfer more powers to the [European] Commission,
which will then handle what falls within the European remit like a government of
Europe. That will require a strong parliament. A kind of second chamber, if you
like, will be the council comprising the heads of [national] government ... And fi-
nally, the supreme court will be the European court of justice." 161
Such close-knit integration of politics and finance sounds more like a United States of
Europe than the present EU. The treaty focuses on one of the main sources of the cri-
sis-reining in reckless national spending by holding each state accountable. But the
agreement failed to address key issues. It says nothing of the future for rescue operations
like the EFSF, how to support flagging nations, or Greece's much-needed restructuring.
Nor does it address the other sources of the crisis, namely, the rising competitiveness
imbalance among EU nations. The S&P cited these shortcomings of the summit when it
downgraded several EU nations in January 2012.162 It also warned that reforms based on
"fiscal austerity alone" can be "self-defeating" in an economic downturn. 163
C. SPRING SHAKEUPS
The shifts in Europe's political landscape this past spring could define the next phases
of the crisis. German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the proponents of an austerity-dom-
156. See Louise Bowman, "Monumental" Uptake of ECB LTRO but Carry-Trade Impact Unlikely, EUROMONEY
(Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.euromoney.com/Article/2952245/Monumental-uptake-of-ECB-LTRO-but-
carry-trade-impact.htnl.
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inated reform program lost a powerful ally this May, as French President Nicolas Sarkozy
was ousted from office. 164 His successor, Frangois Hollande, presents a very different
vision for Europe. Hollande, a Socialist, has pronounced that "[alusterity need not be
Europe's fate," and hopes to stir growth through mechanisms like tax-hikes and govern-
ment stimulus. 165 Germany still has like-minded allies in smaller nations like Holland and
Finland, but it appears the Franco-German dominated Eurozone (evident at the Decem-
ber 2011 summit) has splintered. 166 Political fractions and incoherent leadership could
prove fatal to both visions for Europe. These developments also present a major hurdle
for Merkel's vision of closer political integration within the Eurozone.
There was also political pushback in Greece this spring. Austerity-fatigued and enter-
ing their fifth year of deep recession, the Greeks punished the traditionally dominant
parties at the polls. No party or coalition won enough seats to form a parliament during
"an inconclusive May 6 vote," and the voices on the radical left are growing. 167 The
Syriza coalition is calling for continued Eurozone funding without the austerity program,
under the threat that Greece will simply walk away from its debts if its funding dries up-
a scenario that plays directly into the fears of the bailout-fatigued proponents of
austerity. 16s
In light of this political flux, a quiet run on distressed banks is taking shape. Spanish
depositors withdrew more than a billion euros from Bankia in a week after Spain an-
nounced that it would nationalize the troubled bank.169 Spanish bond yields have surged
dangerously in response. 170 Meanwhile, the ECB has used one of the weapons in its arse-
nal, the "emergency liquidity assistance" (ELA), to keep Greek banks on life-support. 17 1
Barclays estimates that Greece is currently using upwards of C90 billion worth of ELA. 172
As politicians vacillate and elections loom, the ECB wields unprecedented political power,
even if they do not exercise it. If the ECB chose to withdraw its support, it could force
Greece into a disorderly exit.173 Consider what this says of the growing dependence on
the ECB for short-term funding.
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V. What Does the Future Hold?
A. THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM: GREECE SHOULD EXT THE EuRozoNE DESPITE THE
RISK OF CONTAGION
Greece is in a precarious situation. It had been edging towards a disorderly default on
March 20, 2012, when a C14.5 billion bond payment became due. To avoid this, the
Greek government had to wage a two-front battle with private bondholders and the EU.
In the early months of 2012, Greece sought to renegotiate the value of its bonds and to
strike a deal with the EU-IMF for another bailout-this time for C130 billion.' 74 The
bondholders, once debating 50 percent devaluation, now have little choice but to accept a
devastating 70 percent haircut on their notes. 175 Understandably, this has prompted calls
for the ECB (one of Greece's largest public bondholders) to likewise share the burden of a
haircut. After all, why should private bondholders be treated as second-class creditors?
But EU leaders held up the show. They refused to let Greece sign off on the C200
billion bond restructuring program unless it also accepted another round of austerity mea-
sures to bridge its financing gap.176 The EU plan requires deep cuts, including a 25 per-
cent drop in private sector wages and 35 percent in pensions, as well as cutting thousands
of government jobs.177 Essentially, the EU was playing hardball by threatening Greece
with a disorderly default should they fail to step in line behind its austerity plan. Amid
much controversy and violent protests, Greek lawmakers passed the austerity package-
kicking the can down the road once more. 17 8 The EU refuses to release any bailout funds
until the austerity measures are credibly implemented.179 Given the inconclusive May
2012 elections, it is highly speculative whether Greece can muster the political will to
follow through on these measures.
Europe's leaders have begun to question whether Greece is worth saving. In reality,
propping up Greece may no longer be an option. It may be beyond saving. The bailout-
austerity program in place is not sustainable. Greece's previously imposed austerity mea-
sures have only exacerbated its recession. The EU's latest plan for Greece will turn the
screws on its already beleaguered economy. As one Greek politician objected, the EU is
"asking for more recession than the country can take." 8 0 Meanwhile, past bailout funds
have benefited Greece's private creditors, but not Greece itself.' 8 1 The money pumped
into Greece by the EU and IMF flowed right back out again to Greece's creditors, mainly
the banks. 8 2 If it continues on its current path of bailout-austerity, Greece is headed for a
prolonged depression marked by deflation. It will continue to drain Eurozone resources
174. Lefteris Papadimas & Harry Papachristou, Greek Cabinet Approves EUIMF Bailout Bill, REUTERS (Feb.
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as economic growth lags and expensive, euro-denominated debt piles up. If Greece stays
with the Eurozone (or rather, if the Eurozone stays with Greece), it will not be long
before it must come to the EU-IMF for funding once again.183
But Greece's debt-load remains unsustainable. If a bailout-austerity program is not the
answer, then what is? The alternatives to an EU-dominated program are either default or
deep restructuring. An orderly exit from the Eurozone is the least damaging way to
restructure and avoid an outright default on public debt. Greece should be allowed to de
facto default by redenominating its debts under the Greek drachma.
True, the immediate domestic fallout will be severe in Greece. Without market access,
Greece would have to monetize its debt.' 84 A period of sharp inflation and economic
depression would surely follow.1 85 But Greece should look to Iceland as a model. Iceland
defaulted on its debts, bucked the euro, and redenominated with its old currency. A sharp
and painful correction followed, but within three years it was able to re-enter the bond
markets.' 86 Greece too can restore genuine growth by first renegotiating its debts under
the new currency and suffering through a period of sharp depreciation. An exit will also
free up precious Eurozone resources. Instead, these resources can be used to strengthen
the Eurozone's core and to assist Greece's transition.
But what of the grave threats sovereign defaults pose to the banking sector? Greece is
not Italy-its economy is small enough to allow an exit. But the external contagion of a de
facto default would still be acute. It can and should be contained. Nouriel Roubini pro-
poses a practical exit strategy for Greece. 187 He argues the Eurozone should not abruptly
cut-off Greece.' 88 Instead, the ECB and Greece should coordinate how to convert
Greece's debts into drachmas.1s 9 By negotiating the exchange rate, Greece can (and
should) avoid an outright default.' 90 In exchange for Greece's agreement to a long-term
plan for achieving a primary balance, the ECB could redirect funds to recapitalize Greek
banks.' 9' This would help minimize the fallout. But the window to implement such a
strategy is rapidly closing.
B. WHAT WILL THE NEW EuRozoNE LOOK LIE?
Even if the Eurozone cuts Greece loose, it must still get its fiscal house in order. Eu-
rope is awash with debt and liabilities. Most commentators agree that a disorderly
breakup of the Eurozone would be disastrous.' 92 But if breakup is to be avoided, Euro-
pean nations must implement reforms that go beyond curbing volatility and that address
183. See John Mauldin, Staring into the Abyss, MAULDIN ECON. (Jan. 21, 2012), http://
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the root causes of the crisis. This means addressing not simply sovereign debt and bank
insolvency, but also Europe's massive trade and competitiveness imbalances. 19
1. An Orderly Breakup?
Controlled exits are better (or less bad) options than chaotic ones. Conceivably, coun-
tries could exit the Eurozone and return to competing currencies. This scenario would
allow for market-driven solutions. Natural currency devaluations and exchange rates
would account for competitiveness and trade imbalances amongst nations, for example.
Ideally, the change-overs would occur gradually and with strict government oversight.194
There are major downsides to this strategy. For starters, you cannot unscramble the
omelet of the banking sector. The banks' balance sheets have no geopolitical borders.
The market links them all through mechanisms, such as the derivatives trades. 195 And as
bondholders, European banks still have a major stake in each nation's economic well-
being. Also, redenominating debts would be costly and difficult to say the least. The
validity and value of contracts, whose terms contemplate use of the euro, would be ques-
tioned. European governments would have to implement well-planned, and well-exe-
cuted transitions to prevent bank runs (i.e., declare an unexpected bank holiday and
implement the changes overnight, and simultaneously implement controls on trade, capi-
tal, and borders). 196 Market players may also exacerbate volatility by jumping between
currencies during the transition periods (never let a good crisis go to waste). 197
This scenario is unlikely at present. In fact, the chances are practically nonexistent.
There appears little, if any, political will to return to competing currencies. It simply has
not come up for discussion amongst the EU leadership. True, nations like Germany may
privately have a backup plan for their own quick exit should things turn ugly. But we are
more likely to see a chaotic, accidental breakup of the Eurozone than a coordinated one.
On the other hand, if the common currency is to survive, the Eurozone will have to ad-
dress its internal structural imbalances.
2. A Fiscal Union Within a Union?
The route seemingly favored at present is to impose a "stricter supranational discipli-
nary element in Europe." 19s That is, reform will come from the top down. The new
inter-governmental treaty, for example, would favor centralized financial controls.
Mohamed E1-Erian, the CEO of PIMCO, predicts the creation of a "smaller and less
imperfect Eurozone that has a different relationship with the rest of the EU."199 In other
words, Eurozone countries that either cannot or will not control their deficits and debts
193. Adam Waldman, Why the Crisis with the Euro Currency Continues to Drag On, TECHNORA1I1 (Dec. 12,
2011, 7:29 PM), http://technorati.com/business/finance/article/why-the-crisis-with-the-euro/.
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would get kicked out, and the remaining Eurozone would battens down its hatches. El-
Erian is on the right track. Already this scenario is playing out in the struggle between
Greece and the EU-IMF. The EU essentially told Greece it either must accept EU over-
sight or go bankrupt.200 Then, even after Greece's parliament passed the controversial
austerity measures, Germany's finance minister suggested that Greece should suspend its
upcoming elections and install a technocrat instead.2 01 One has to wonder whether the
Eurozone has truly lost all respect for national sovereignty, or if Greece is deliberately
being shown the door.
But closer integration within the Eurozone has some troubling aspects. First, there is
the danger of massive collateral damage if a country like Greece or Portugal is forced out
in a disorderly way (i.e., if it is pushed into an unplanned default). Also, for the remaining
Eurozone nations, political independence could be compromised. EU leaders like Merkel
(and formerly, Sarkozy) are pushing for unprecedented EU control over traditionally in-
ternal national affairs.202 An executive board member of the ECB has suggested that per-
haps the "cathartic effects of crises" will bring about this shift of authority towards the
"supranational" level.203 The idea of waiting until Europeans' backs are against the wall to
usurp powers traditionally reserved to sovereign governments is a radical one. Europeans
should beware of the ECB or the European Commission dictating their futures if closer
political integration is not truly what they want.
Despite these controversies, this is the path Europe is most likely to take given the
growing divisions between the fiscal Eurozone and the larger, political EU. The EU De-
cember 2011 summit and the recent developments in Greece point towards a growing
divide. Also, there has already been political pushback against the ECB's attempts to cen-
tralize fiscal policy. In the first ever legal proceeding of its kind, the British government
filed a lawsuit against the ECB after it enacted a new restriction on clearing houses.2 04
The regulation would require all clearing houses that clear Euro-denominated securities
to be physically located within the Eurozone.205 London, where 40 percent of over-the-
counter derivatives global trade is based, would be cut off from this market.2 06 The finan-
cial heavy-hitter LCH Clearnet would likely be forced to shut its doors. The lawsuit
points towards a fracturing of Europe's current dual-union structure and a movement
towards a more tightly integrated political and fiscal Eurozone-a new union within the
union. It remains to be seen which nations are either willing or able to be a part of this
new union.
3. Focus on Fiscal Reforms?
The "union within a union" scenario seems the most likely structural reform. But it
may occur in conjunction with direct fiscal reforms. If Eurozone leaders want to control
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the type of fiscal reform (i.e., instead of the market choosing for them), they will have to
act swiftly. The longer they vacillate, the more options will be foreclosed under market
strain. To have any effect, fiscal reforms would have to address Europe's crushing debt.
This means the reforms would either have to reduce or restructure the existing debt.
For starters, the less likely option is debt reduction. There are three avenues to debt
reduction: (1) growth, (2) inflation, and (3) under-consumption and savings. Ideally, a
country would naturally grow its GDP to counteract its debt. But this is unlikely given
the current recession. Investment and demand are both slow-moving, and significant
growth would be necessary just to stabilize the debts of some countries.20 7 Inflation is
another route to overall debt reduction and perhaps the default solution (that is, if the
markets react more swiftly than the politicians).208 But generally, governments have kept
interest rates artificially low in spite of massive capital injections. 20 9 The danger that gov-
ernments fear, of course, is inflation spiraling out of control as the public loses faith in the
currency. 210
The alternative is under-consumption and savings. Given the inability of countries to
grow, and the unwillingness of governments to inflate, this is the most likely choice for
debt reduction. In fact, we have already seen Greece and Portugal accept tough austerity
measures. Theoretically, countries could rebuild savings and pay down their debts by
living below their means. But this route is dangerous if the private and public sectors both
pursue it simultaneously (i.e., via under-consumption and austerity measures). 2" Reces-
sionary symptoms already present will become amplified. Slow growth and unemploy-
ment, for example, could spike. To counter a deep recession, a country would have to run
a trade surplus.212 But to achieve a trade surplus without growth, a country would have to
significantly lower its labor costs. This would hurt the little guy.
If debt reduction proves impractical, the second option for fiscal reform is debt restruc-
turing. It is more likely that banks and sovereigns will choose this path. There are three
extreme forms of debt restructuring that Europe may pursue: (1) outright quantitative
easing, (2) issuance of Eurobonds, and (3) controlled write downs.
Quantitative easing, or massive capital injections, is one way to combat unsustainable
debt. If any institution can or will do this, it will not be the EFSF; it will be the ECB. As
previously discussed, the EFSF faces the same solvency and credibility problems as sover-
eign nations. The ECB, on the other hand, operates supra-nationally and has the keys to
the euro printing presses. Some of its prior emergency measures, such as the LTRO plan,
already exhibit the characteristics of quantitative easing. Those who view such measures
as half-hearted are calling for the ECB to launch a full-scale operation and to act as the
"Lender of Last Resort"-i.e., directly backstopping government debt by purchasing
bonds en masse.2 13 To accomplish this, the ECB would have to be willing to print euros
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liberally. But so far, Germany has staunchly opposed this course. 214 Germany likely fears
not only hyperinflation, but also putting its own solvency on the line. 2 s Those who wish
to avoid the subject flatly object that quantitative easing is beyond the ECB's powers
under the Maatricht Treaty.
216
A common Eurobond would restructure sovereign debt by spreading out the collective
debt burden among Eurozone members. In theory, a Eurobond would mean each
Eurozone nation would pay the same interest rate on its debt, and repayment would be
communized. 217 Those who oppose the Eurobond argue that interest rate differentials are
one of the last bulwarks of discipline against reckless sovereign borrowing.21 At any rate,
once again, the more fiscally sound countries like Germany vehemently oppose this op-
tion, which has virtually no upside appeal for them. A Eurobond would essentially cross-
collateralize sovereign debt, and the German people are understandably opposed to acting
as a guarantor for the weaker, periphery nations. Germany would probably agree to this
solution only after a tighter fiscal union within a union is created, and the weaker links
within the Eurozone like Greece or Portugal have been squeezed out or become thor-
oughly controllable. Eurobonds recently found a new champion in the newly elected
French President Hollande-a development that has rekindled this debate.219 It remains
to be seen whether Germany stands its ground on mutualizing Europe's debt, but the
Eurobond could prove a defining issue.
If the Eurozone cannot or will not implement quantitative easing or shuffle the debt
with Eurobonds, we could very well see systematic write-downs of sovereign, and even
private, debt. Coordinated or controlled write-downs of existing debt would be an ex-
treme method of restructuring because such measures are devastating to the confidence of
creditors and investors alike. Additionally, if the cuts are broad enough, they have the
potential to wipe out the banks, which were heavily exposed to that debt and then forced
to swallow its loss. 220 On the plus side, write-downs result in real debt relief and end the
painful process of deleveraging.221 To see how these write-downs work in practice, one
need only look to the ongoing negotiations between Greece and its private bondholders.
Forced write-downs are like the government hitting a credit restart button-it is jarring
and risky, but hopefully will clear the path for true growth.
To be effective, write-downs would have to target the most heavily leveraged sectors for
each nation, and wherever possible, acknowledge the vast losses of creditors. For example,
some nations like Greece and Italy would likely implement a write-down on sovereign
debt. For others, a write-down on consumer loans or other private debts may be more
effective. To prevent a collapse in the banking sector, governments may decide to recapi-
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talize the banks after imposing strict controls to prevent bank runs. They may also decide
to impose a one-time wealth-tax on financial assets to cushion the write-offs.2 2 Finally,
for the restructuring to result in true growth, governments would have to obey strict debt
ceilings going forward. 223 But any restructuring that asks the public to pay for the mis-
takes of sovereigns and banks is a political minefield.
C. THE BANKING SECTOR URGENTLY NEEDS FiscAL REFORM
If there is one thing the crisis should teach us, it is that markets move more swiftly than
governments. Whether the Eurozone nations choose closer integration or keep the status
quo and instead focus solely on fiscal reforms, these political reforms will likely not keep
pace with growing economic hazards. It is not enough to implement structural reforms
reactively. Europe should proactively address the hazards in the banking sector.
1. Regulatory Reform
Better capital controls and regulations are necessary going forward to curtail risky be-
havior by banks. The Basel III accords endorsed by the G-20 nations are a step in the
right direction. They would require banks to hold a higher percentage of capital as a
buffer for economic downturns and introduce a new leverage ratio.22 4 But these reforms
will not be fully phased in until 2019.225 It is also unclear how or if they will apply to non-
financial institutions that created massive problems in 2008, such as hedge funds. To pre-
vent banks from gaming the system, the leverage ratio ought to apply more rigorously and
as broadly as possible across the financial sector (i.e., even to off-the-books sources of risk,
like structured investment vehicles). The leverage ratio should have been the focal point
of Basel I1, instead of a "backstop" to support the new capital rules.226 And although
banks lobbied against Basel mH227 (evidence that it is, in fact, on the right track), even more
capital buffers would be welcome given the banks' gigantic leverage ratios.
Because Basel Ed will take years to implement, governments might consider more im-
mediate reforms. One alternative to direct regulation would be a financial transactions
tax, one that targets risky and socially unproductive transactions (i.e., credit default swaps).
In September 2011, the European Commission submitted a proposal for such a tax. 22s
But to be effective, this tax would need to be universally applied-a daunting challenge for
political leaders.2 29 It is also likely that financial institutions would find ways around the
222. Id. at 7.
223. Id. at 9.
224. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Reforms - Basel Ill: Summary Table, BANK INT'L SEVLE-
MENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3/b3sununarytable.pdf (last visited July 4, 2012) [hereinafter Basel III].
225. Jack Ewing, Top Central Banker Urges No Delay to Basel III, DEALBOOK (Jan. 27, 2012, 11:24 AM), http://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/01/27/a-top-central-banker-urges-no-delay-to-basel-iii/.
226. Basel II, supra note 224.
227. Ewing, supra note 225.





786 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
tax, either by doing business in friendlier jurisdictions or by passing the cost of the tax
onto consumers. 230
2. Transparent Accounting
Banks should be held accountable for their investments-good or bad. It should be
obvious to depositors and investors how much risk their banks have assumed. The only
way to achieve this is to implement transparent accounting rules, and allow the IASB to
function as a politically independent body. Mark-to-market accounting methods should
be revived and strengthened. Banks should not be allowed to shuffle around their mal-
investments to hide their insolvency. Accounting loopholes (like a bank recording ques-
tionable profits when its own bonds decline in value) should be closed. Solid accounting
rules will go a long way towards strengthening fiscal reforms.
V1. Conclusion
The time to act is now. European leaders should focus their efforts on achieving true
fiscal reform and debt reduction. Instead of shuffling mal-investment from banks to cen-
tral banks, there must be meaningful liquidation to clear the path for true growth. It
would be a mistake to think that endlessly subsidizing countries and banks that have made
poor choices is a recipe for economic growth. A business model that allows a company to
leverage itself excessively and continuously without accepting any of the corresponding
risk would naturally provoke outrage on the part of those who are stuck with the bailout
bill for that company when it bets the wrong way. Why should this logic not apply to
banks and sovereigns?
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